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OPINION OF THE COURT  
 
SLOVITER, Circuit Judge: 
 
Plaintiffs Alan Carey, Stephen Hoffman, and Jack Leib (the "Supervisors"), 
who filed this action for a 
declaratory judgment against Employers Mutual Casualty Co. ("Employers 
Mutual"), appeal the decision of 
the District Court denying their motion for summary judgment and granting 
summary judgment in favor of 
Employers Mutual. Employers Mutual had issued an errors and omissions 
insurance policy in favor of 
Berwick Township, Pa. (the "Township"). Plaintiffs filed this action 
seeking a determination that Employers 
Mutual is obligated to defend and indemnify them from a surcharge filed 
against them by the Audit 
Committee of the Township.  
 I.  
 
The parties stipulated to the material facts. Carey, Hoffman, and Leib 
were supervisors for the Township 
during 1993. In May of that year, the Township entered into a contract 
with Berwick Enterprises, which 
was constructing a golf course and contiguous residential tracts. The 
Township agreed to design and 
construct a sewage treatment system and a storage lagoon that would 
connect to the golf course's irrigation 
system. Additionally, the Township agreed to pay certain construction 
costs associated with the irrigation 
system. The contract specified that the Township agreed to pay $240,000, 
but if the construction cost less 
than that amount, the Township would receive the benefit. Berwick 
Enterprises constructed the irrigation 
system and billed the Township the $240,000 referenced in the contract. 
After the system was installed, the 
Township's engineer, Group Hanover, Inc., analyzed the project and 
concluded that the excavation cost for 
the irrigation system was only $84,466. However, the report cautioned that 
the analysis did not take into 
account a variety of other relevant expenses. As a result of the 
engineer's estimate, the Supervisors 
negotiated a compromise and settlement under which Berwick Enterprises 
received $216,000. The 
Township paid $65,000 in cash and the remainder by a promissory note for 
$151,000, with interest at six 
percent. Appellant Leib signed the promissory note on behalf of the 
Township on January 24, 1994.  
 
In March 1996, the Township's Audit Committee concluded that the 
Supervisors had negligently overpaid 
Berwick Enterprises $140,216.50, representing the excess of principal and 
interest beyond the engineer's 
estimate of the cost ($84,466), and entered a notice of surcharge of 
$140,216.50, the difference between 
the cost to the Township of $224,682.50 (the settlement figure of $216,000 
and interest of $8,682.50 on 
the note) and the engineer's estimate. The reasons set forth by the Audit 
Committee for imposition of the 
surcharge were that the Committee had not been provided with any detailed 
invoice or other documentation 
contradicting Group Hanover's valuation of the project, and that the 
Township should have followed a public 
bidding process for the project.  
 
Pursuant to the applicable procedure, the Supervisors filed a notice of 
appeal from the Audit Committee's 
Report in the Court of Common Pleas of Adams County seeking relief from 
the Audit Report and notice of 
surcharge. They claimed, inter alia, that they had acted reasonably and in 
good faith in compromising the 
disputed claim and that the Audit Committee had not correctly accounted 
for all the relevant costs incurred 
by the contractor in connection with the irrigation project. That 
litigation was stayed pending resolution of 
this case.  
 
The Supervisors sought coverage from Employers Mutual under the errors and 
omissions (E&O) insurance 
policy purchased by the Township, which was effective June 1995 to June 
1996 and which covered claims 
made for alleged wrongful acts after June 4, 1987. Employers Mutual denied 
coverage on three separate 
grounds: the policy specifically excluded from covered losses any "[f]ines 
or penalties imposed by law," see 
App. at 120; the policy excluded " `[w]rongful' acts involving . . 
.[a]mounts actually or allegedly due under 
the terms of a payment or performance contract," see App. at 121; and the 
policy excluded "[a]ny claim 
brought by any federal, state or local governmental regulatory body," see 
App. at 122. The insurer also 
contended that its defense and indemnification of the Supervisors would 
violate public policy.  
 
The Supervisors filed a declaratory judgment action in the Court of Common 
Pleas of Adams County in 
February 1997 alleging that they were entitled to defense and 
indemnification under the insurance policy. 
Employers Mutual, an Iowa corporation, removed the case to federal court 
and answered, citing the three 
exclusions from coverage referred to above. Both parties moved for summary 
judgment. On January 28, 
1998, the District Court granted Employers Mutual's motion, concluding 
that the surcharge action was a fine 
or penalty under the policy terms; the court consequently declined to 
reach the other policy exclusions relied 
on by Employers Mutual.  
 
The supervisors filed a timely notice of appeal. We have jurisdiction 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Our 
review is plenary. See Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Pipher, 140 F.3d 
222, 224 (3d Cir. 1998). The 
parties agree that Pennsylvania law applies.  
 
II.  
 
An errors and omissions insurance policy is a form of professional 
liability insurance designed to insure 
certain classes of professionals from risks such as negligence. See Lee R. 
Russ, Couch on Insurance § 
131:38, at 131-49 to -50 (3d ed. 1997). In essence, an E&O policy is a 
form of malpractice insurance. 
National Ass'n of Realtors v. National Real Estate Ass'n, Inc., 894 F.2d 
937, 938 (7th Cir. 1990); 
Syndicate 420 at Lloyd's London v. Early Am. Ins. Co., 796 F.2d 821, 824 
n.2 (5th Cir. 1986).  
 
Other types of policies, such as those issued for corporate directors and 
officers, which often contain E&O 
provisions, commonly exclude coverage for fines and penalties. See 3 
Rowland H. Long, The Law of 
Liability Insurance § 12A.05[7][a][iii], at 12A-95 (1989).  
 
The Supervisors urge that the policy language "[f]ine or penalty imposed 
by law" is ambiguous and must be 
construed against Employers Mutual as the drafter of the policy. See 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Dep't 
of Transp. v. Semanderes, 109 Pa. Commw. 505, 511, 531 A.2d 815, 818 
(Commw. Ct. 1987) ("When a 
contract is ambiguous, it is undisputed that the rule of contra 
proferentem requires the language to be 
construed against the drafter . .. and in favor of the other party if the 
latter's interpretation is reasonable.") 
The District Court concluded that the issue is not whether the policy 
itself is ambiguous, but rather whether 
the surcharge is a fine or penalty and thereby excluded from coverage.  
 
There are not many cases dealing with the scope of a fines and penalties 
clause in an insurance contract. 
Counsel for Employers Mutual stated that he had found none. Our research 
has uncovered only a few, and 
those are not direct analogs. The decisions often turn on the precise 
language of the policy.  
 
For example, in Page Wellcome, Professional Service Corp. v. Home 
Insurance Co., 758 F. Supp. 1375 
(D. Mont. 1991), aff'd, 993 F.2d 887 (9th Cir. 1993), Wellcome, an 
attorney who was sanctioned by a 
state trial court for giving a closing argument that violated the court's 
in limine ruling, sought and was denied 
coverage by his professional liability insurer on the ground that the 
sanction was a "fine or penalty," which the 
policy expressly excluded from the definition of covered "damages." The 
federal district court agreed with 
the insurer, holding that the policy was clear and unambiguous in its 
prohibition of fines, which the court 
defined as "the payment of money imposed upon a person for misconduct." 
Id. at 1379-80. The court ruled 
that because the sanction was imposed for misconduct, it constituted a 
fine and the insurer had no duty to 
indemnify or defend. Id. at 1380-81.  
 
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit certified the question to the Montana Supreme 
Court. See Wellcome v. Home 
Ins. Co., 849 P.2d 190, 191 (Mont. 1993). The Montana Supreme Court 
rejected Wellcome's argument 
that the term"fine" is limited to criminal statutes and that sanctions are 
neither fines, penalties, nor any other 
type of punishment. The Court referred to Black's Law Dictionary in 
holding that a fine is a pecuniary 
punishment, and that this meaning is clear and well understood. Wellcome, 
849 P.2d at 193. It thus 
concluded that the policy excluded coverage for Wellcome because the 
sanction imposed on him was a 
punitive fine or penalty. Id. at 194; see also Dixon v. Home Indem. Co., 
426 S.E.2d 381, 382-83 (Ga. Ct. 
App. 1993) (holding that term "sanctions" in exclusion for fines, 
statutory penalties, and sanctions prevents 
coverage for award of attorneys fees imposed to deter filing of frivolous 
lawsuit).  
 
The issue of the scope of a policy exclusion of coverage for fines or 
penalties also may arise when coverage 
is sought for the payment of punitive damages.1 See Long, supra, § 
12B.05[1], at 12B-92. For example, in 
Collins & Aikman Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 436 S.E.2d 
243 (N.C. 1993), a trucking 
company, which maintained an umbrella/excess liability policy for damages 
arising from its operations, was 
held liable for $2.5 million in compensatory and $4 million in punitive 
damages following a serious accident. 
The parties settled for $4.2 million. The insurer refused to cover the 
punitive damages, on the ground that the 
policy stated that " `damages' do not include fines or penalties." Id. at 
246. The court rejected this argument, 
holding that the term "penalty" in the policy exclusion was at least 
ambiguous and, therefore, it must be 
interpreted against the insurer who wrote the policy. The court thought 
"[i]t takes some construing of the 
word `penalty' to hold that it includes punitive damages," and declined to 
so hold. Id. at 247.  
 
Finally, some cases address the scope of a fines or 
_________________________________________________________________  
 
1. Generally, courts are divided on the public policy question whether an 
insurer may indemnify punitive 
damages. See Long, supra, § 12A.05[7][a][iii], at 12A-96 to -97; see also 
Barry R. Ostrager & Thomas R. 
Newman, Handbook on Insurance Coverage Disputes ch. 14 (9th ed. 1998). 
penalties exclusion as it 
applies to coverage for various administratively imposed sanctions. In 
that situation, the courts usually have 
looked to the nature of the sanction in determining whether the policy 
excludes coverage. For example, in 
St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Briggs, 464 N.W.2d 535 (Minn. Ct. App. 
1991), the Internal Revenue 
Service (IRS) sought to recover the employer's unpaid withholding taxes 
from two officers personally. The 
relevant Internal Revenue Code ("IRC") provision made the individuals 
liable for a "penalty equal to the total 
amount of the tax evaded, or not collected, or not accounted for and paid 
over." Id. at 537 (quoting 26 
U.S.C.§ 6672 (1989)).  
 
The insurer had issued a directors' and officers' liability policy 
covering negligence, errors, omissions, and 
breaches of duty, but excluding fines and penalties or other losses deemed 
uninsurable by law. The insurer 
argued that the tax assessments were excluded penalties. The Minnesota 
court disagreed, holding that the § 
6672 liability was not a penalty within the language of the policy 
exclusion. In so holding, it relied on several 
federal court decisions that ruled that, despite the "penalty" language of 
the Code provision, the assessment 
was not penal in nature, i.e., the penalty was not punitive. Nonetheless, 
the court in Briggs concluded that 
"insurance coverage for nonpayment of taxes would be contrary to public 
policy," id. at 539, and held the 
insurer had no duty to defend or indemnify.  
 
An Iowa court looked differently at excise taxes under IRC § 4975(a) that 
the IRS imposed on the insureds 
for their improper dealings with an ERISA pension plan. See Hofco, Inc. v. 
National Union Fire Ins. Co., 
482 N.W.2d 397 (Iowa 1992). The insurance policy covered loss because of 
any breach of fiduciary duty, 
but excluded fines and penalties from the term "loss." The court concluded 
that the policy did not cover the 
five-percent excise tax imposed by the IRS. The court held that "penalty," 
though undefined, was not 
ambiguous, relying on Black's Law Dictionary for the meaning of penalty as 
money that the law exacts as 
punishment for either doing a prohibited act or not doing a required act. 
Reviewing the cases and legislative 
history of the excise tax at issue, the court concluded that"the excise 
tax statute was passed to shift the 
sanction for a violation of the prohibited transaction provision from the 
trust or plan to the parties." Id. at 
402. It reasoned that the purpose of the excise tax was (1) to prohibit 
certain conduct, not to raise revenue; 
(2) to impose the tax on the specific individuals involved in the 
prohibited transaction; and (3) to curb the 
prohibited conduct through pecuniary punishment. Id. at 403. Therefore, it 
held that the tax was a penalty 
rather than a tax, and the policy provided no coverage.  
 
In summary, the available case law suggests that an exclusion for fines 
and penalties, where those terms are 
undefined in the policy, allows an insurer to deny coverage when the item 
to be covered is punitive, rather 
than merely compensatory. Supporting this conclusion is the fact that "a 
significant number of states" prohibit 
insurance for fines and penalties that are penal, rather than remedial or 
compensatory, in nature. See 
Ostrager & Newman, supra, § 10.03[d], at 551. Moreover, there are cases 
holding that punitive fines and 
penalties are not insurable as"damages." See, e.g., City of Fort Pierre v. 
United Fire & Cas. Co., 463 
N.W.2d 845, 849 (S.D. 1990) (holding that civil penalties for Clean Water 
Act violation were punitive and 
uninsurable as a matter of public policy). But see Weeks v. St. Paul Fire 
& Marine Ins. Co., 673 A.2d 772 
(N.H. 1996) (observing that, where insurer has failed to expressly exclude 
fines and penalties, court would 
not relieve insurer of obligation to pay compensatory surcharge that was 
arguably punitive in nature).  
 
With this background, we turn to consider whether the surcharge noticed by 
the Township is punitive in 
nature and hence a fine or penalty excluded from coverage by Employers 
Mutual's policy.  
 
III.  
 
We focus on the nature of the surcharge provision. Because there are no 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court cases 
on point, we are left to predict whether that court would interpret the 
surcharge at issue as a punitive fine or 
penalty. See Borman v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 960 F.2d 327, 331 (3d Cir. 
1992). Pennsylvania law directs 
township auditors to:  
 
surcharge any elected or appointed officer for the amount of any loss to 
the township caused in whole or in 
part by the officer's act or omission in violation of law or beyond the 
scope of the officer's authority. If the 
auditors find an absence of intent to violate the law or exceed the scope 
of authority. . . the surcharge 
imposed shall be limited to the difference between the costs actually 
incurred by the township and the costs 
that would have been incurred had legal means and authorized procedures 
been employed. Provisions of this 
section which limit the amount of surcharge do not apply to cases 
involving fraud or collusion on the part of 
the officers or to any penalty issuing to the benefit of or payable to the 
Commonwealth.  
 
53 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 65907(a) (emphasis added).  
 
The only reported Pennsylvania case to address the nature of a surcharge 
is In re Appeal from Report of 
Audit of South Union Township for 1975, 47 Pa. Cmwlth. 1, 407 A.2d 906 
(Commw. Ct. 1979). There, 
the Board of Auditors appealed the dismissal by the Court of Common Pleas 
of Fayette County of the 
surcharges filed against two township supervisors covering, inter alia, 
amounts paid to the supervisors as 
compensation for use of their automobiles, amounts paid to township 
employees to be used for 
hospitalization insurance premiums, and back wages paid to employees 
pursuant to an arbitration. The 
Commonwealth Court sustained the trial court's dismissal of the 
surcharges, primarily because the 
supervisors had not abused their discretion in making the payments. 
Significantly, in at least two instances, 
the appellate court sustained the dismissal of the surcharges because it 
had not been shown that the township 
sustained a financial loss, thereby signifying that the purpose of the 
surcharge is to compensate for loss 
suffered. Id. at 3-5, 7, 407 A.2d at 908-10. That compensatory purpose is 
further reflected in the reason 
the court gave in holding the trial court erred in refusing to call one 
supervisor to testify on the ground that it 
would violate his right against self-incrimination. The Commonwealth 
Court, although finding the error 
harmless, held that the proceeding was civil, not quasi-criminal, and 
observed that "the function of the 
surcharge is remedial and not punitive, i.e., it is designed to reimburse 
the government for losses resulting 
from some misconduct of its officials." Id. at 8, 407 A.2d at 910.  
 
In the case before us on appeal, the District Court, focusing on the 
question whether the Audit Committee's 
surcharge constituted a penalty, analogized this surcharge to the one 
imposed in trusts and estates law 
forfiduciaries who are negligent in their duties. In support of this 
analogy, the District Court observed that, 
under Pennsylvania law, a public official acts as afiduciary in holding 
public funds. See Columbia Cas. Co. v. 
Westmoreland County, 365 Pa. 271, 274, 74 A.2d 86, 88 (1950).  
 
In the trusts and estates context, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has 
held,  
 
Surcharge is the penalty for failure to exercise common prudence, common 
skill and common caution in the 
performance of the fiduciary's duty and is imposed to compensate 
beneficiaries for loss caused by the 
fiduciary's want of due care.  
 
In re Miller's Estate, 345 Pa. 91, 93, 26 A.2d 320, 321 (1942) (emphasis 
added); accord In re Trust of 
Munro v. Commonwealth Nat'l Bank, 373 Pa. Super. 448, 452, 541 A.2d 756, 
758 (Super. Ct. 1988). By 
the plain terms of this definition, the Pennsylvania courts construe 
thefiduciary's surcharge to be 
compensatory, even though it is also considered a penalty. Based in part 
on this analogy, in conjunction with 
the precedent describing the surcharge as remedial rather than punitive, 
and the statute that authorizes 
surcharges "for the amount of any loss to the township caused by the 
officer's act," we conclude that the 
surcharge is not punitive but remedial.  
 
Of course, Employers Mutual could have expressly excluded surcharges from 
coverage under its E&O 
policy, but it failed to do so. Therefore, the Supervisors argue, the 
policy is at best ambiguous as to the 
exclusion of the surcharge.  
 
"A provision of a contract of insurance is ambiguous if reasonably 
intelligent persons, considering it in the 
context of the whole policy, would differ regarding its meaning." State 
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Moore, 
375 Pa. Super. 470, 475-76, 544 A.2d 1017, 1019 (Super. Ct. 1988) (quoting 
Musisko v. Equitable Life 
Assurance Soc., 344 Pa. Super. 101, 106, 496 A.2d 28, 31 (Super. Ct. 
1985)). Looking at this policy as a 
whole, we agree that the policy drafted by Employers Mutual is ambiguous 
regarding coverage for this 
surcharge because it is susceptible to more than one interpretation 
regarding what it covers.  
 
Significantly, the policy does not define the terms "fine" or "penalty" 
anywhere. As the precedents discussed 
earlier demonstrate, a fines or penalties exclusion may be raised in a 
wide variety of situations not all of 
which are clearly excluded under this language.  
 
Pennsylvania law, like that of many states, provides:  
 
[W]here the language of a policy prepared by an insurer is either 
ambiguous, obscure, uncertain or 
susceptible to more than one construction, courts will construe the 
language most strongly against the insurer 
and accept the construction most favorable to the insured.  
 
D'Allessandro v. Durham Life Ins. Co., 503 Pa. 33, 37, 467 A.2d 1303, 1305 
(1983) (citing Ehrlich v. 
U.S. Fidelity & Guar. Co., 356 Pa. 417, 423, 51 A.2d 794, 797 (1947)). 
Consequently, we hold that the 
fines and penalties exclusion in the E&O policy here does not 
unambiguously exclude the surcharge imposed 
by the Audit Committee, and the District Court erred in granting summary 
judgment for Employers Mutual.  
 
In reaching this conclusion, we do not hold that Employers Mutual must 
defend or indemnify the 
Supervisors. The insurance company raised two other exclusions that the 
District Court did not address. On 
remand, the District Court may consider those alternative exclusions.  
 
IV.  
 
For the reasons set forth, we will reverse and remand to the District 
Court for further proceedings consistent 
with this opinion. A True Copy: Teste:  
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